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EVIDENCE-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES-SURPRISE AS GROUNDS FOR IM-
PEACHING A PARTY'S OWN WITNESS-The defendant was convicted of the 
statutory rape of his stepdaughter. Immediately following the alleged of-
fense, the victim had signed a statement accusing the defendant of the crime 
charged. Before the trial, however, the district attorney was advised by 
the defense counsel, and by the victim herself, that the written statement 
was not true. At the trial, when called as a witness by the commonwealth, 
the girl repudiated her earlier statement, whereupon the district attorney 
pleaded surprise and was permitted to use the prior statement to impeach. 
On appeal, held, affirmed. The district attorney was "actually surprised" 
when the witness repudiated her earlier statement, and so he could impeach 
the witness to neut;ralize the effect of the unexpected testimony. Common-
wealth v. Bowers, (Pa. Super. 1956) 127 A. (2d) 806. · 
By the early common law rule a party could not impeach his own wit-
ness1 by prior inconsistent statements.2 The rule has yielded a little to 
severe criticism,3 and now, in most jurisdictions, either by statute or by 
1 Ladd, "Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments," 4 UNIV. Cm. L. 
REv. 69 (1936). The reasons advanced for the rule are (1) that the party by calling the 
witness to testify vouches for his trustworthiness, (2) that by having the power to impeach 
puts a powerful coercive tool in the hands of a party in getting a witness to testify a 
certain way. The answers advanced against these reasons are that as to the first the fact is 
that a party usually has little choice in choosing his witness and as to the second, it would 
have validity only if a party could impeach by showing bad character. McCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE §38 (1954). 
2 It is clear that under no circuxnstances will a party be allowed to impeach his own 
witness by showing bad character or corruption. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§900, 
901 (1940). 
3 3 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §896 et seq. (1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §38 (1954). 
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court rule, a party is allowed to impeach his witness by cross-examination.4 
Two requirements have been judicially grafted onto these statutes and 
court rules, viz., the party calling the witness must be surprised by the tes-
timony, and the testimony itself must be damaging.5 '\,Vhat will constitute 
surprise is said to rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.6 The 
problem presented by the principal case is whether or not notice that a 
witness' testimony will not be as expected is sufficient to negate a claim of 
surprise at the trial.7 The courts have not agreed on the answer to this 
question. Many state, and a few fed~ral, decisions hold that when a party 
has reasonable notice that the testimony of his witness will be different from 
that which was anticipated, the party cannot claim surprise.8 These courts 
seem to require a complete lack of awareness on the part of counsel that 
the witness will change his story. In some states, however, and in most of 
the federal courts, prior notice alone is not enough to defeat a claim of 
surprise.9 These courts seem not to regard surprise as the equivalent of 
being taken unaware. Rather, by comparing the statements relied upon 
with the notice of change, they look to see whether the party was reason-
ably justified in expecting the witness to testify a certain way.10 The Ian-
4 For a discussion of the various types of statutes, see Ladd, "Impeachment of One's 
Own Witness-New Developments,'' 4 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1936). Also see 11 OHIO STATE 
L.J. 364 (1950). Illinois seems to be one of the few states still adhering to the common 
law rule. See 1953 !LL. L. FORUM 296. 
5 Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 200; Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 
362, 102 P. 57 (1909); People v. LeBeau, 39 Cal. (2d) 146, 245 P. (2d) 302 (1952), noted 
in 42 CALIF. L. REv. 178 (1954). See 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931) on the right of a party surprised 
by unfavorable testimony of own witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent 
statements. 
6 Wheeler v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1953) 211 F. (2d) 19; Sturgis v. State, note 5 
supra. In United States v. Maggio, (3d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 155, it was held that there 
was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's acceptance of an unsworn statement by coun-
sel that he was surprised as the basis for allowing impeachment of a witness called by 
counsel. As was said in London Guarantee &: Accident Co. v. Woelfle, (8th Cir. 1936) 
83 F. (2d) 325 at 334, "the claim of surprise has become largely a gesture, which adds 
little or nothing to the trial court's discretion." 
7 There was no problem over whether the prosecutor's case had been damaged in the 
principal case. The courts generally hold that the scope of impeachment is limited to 
neutralizing the damage caused by the surprising testimony. See People v. Le Beau, note 5 
supra. 
s See Gondek v. Pliska, 135 Conn. 610, 67 A. (2d) 552 (1949); State v. Johnson, 220 
La. 1075, 58 S. (2d) 389 (1952); Thompson v. State, 97 Okla. Cr. 253, 261 P. (2d) 900 
(1953); Williams v. State, 184 Ark. 622, 43 S.W. (2d) 731 (1931); Young v. United States, 
note 5 supra. 
9 Wheeler v. United States, note 6 supra; Weaver v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 216 
F. (2d) 23; United States v. Graham, (2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 436; People v. Spinosa, 115 
Cal. App. (2d) 659, 252 P. (2d) 409 (1953). 
10 See the Graham case, note 9 supra, where the district attorney was allowed to cross-
examine his witness as to statements made at two former trials even though the witness 
had told the district attorney that he would not so testify and that the prior statements 
were false. The court said in effect that the district attorney was privileged to believe that 
when the witness was placed under oath he would testify as he had done at the two prior 
trials. For a very liberal view see London Guarantee &: Accident Co. v. Woelfle, note 6 
supra, where the plaintiff was allowed to impeach her own witness "in the interest of seek-
ing truth and securing justice." 
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guage of the court in the principal case seems to place 1t m this line of 
authority.11 From the cases suggesting this more liberal approach, at 
least two rules of thumb can be derived. Usually, if the statement relied 
upon was given under oath and the contradictory one was not, it is said 
that a party is justified in calling the witness with the expectation that he 
will testify in accordance with his prior statement.12 Conversely, where the 
form of notice is under oath and the statement relied upon is not, most 
courts would find no surprise.13 When bot:1;1 statements are either under 
oath or unsworn no general rule of prediction can be made.14 
The no-impeachment rule seems questionable at best.15 The chief rea-
son currently advanced in support of the rule is the fear that a party will 
call a witness whom he knows to be hostile in order to get the prior state-
ments before the jury, hoping that the jury will use them (improperly, of 
11 See principal case, at 808, where the court says, ". . . the Commonwealth was 
entirely justified in believing that ... she would respect the sanctity of her oath, and that 
her testimony in all probability would accord with the recitals of her statement freely 
given immediately after the event." 
12 Wheeler v. United States, see note 6 supra; United States v. Graham, note 9 supra. 
13 State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E. (2d) 72 (1940); Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enter-
prise, Inc., 98 Cal. App. (2d) 240, 219 P. (2d) 928 (1950). Clearly in a jurisdiction which 
applies a strict rule the same result would follow. See Hartley v. Crede, (W. Va. 1954) 
82 S.E. (2d) 672. Contra, Weaver v. United States, note 9 supra. 
14 See People v. Spinosa, note 9 supra, where two contradictory statements were given 
under oath at the same proceeding and the party was allowed to rely on one. Sullivan v. 
United States, (9th Cir. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 147. 
15 It should be noted that surprise is not the only ground upon which a party may 
be permitted to put in prior inconsistent statements to impeach his own witness. As the 
principal case indicates, where the party has no choice in calling the witness, he will be 
allowed to impeach the witness without showing surprise. People v. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419, 
449 N.W. 296 (1891); Commonwealth v. Sarkis, 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A. (2d) 360 (1949); 
Meeks v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 319. Some courts will call a witness on 
their own initiative or at the request of a party when neither side is willing to vouch for 
the witness' veracity. Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 490. [This case 
is a sequel to the first action, Young v. United States, note 5 supra. Following the holding 
in the first trial that the prosecuting attorney could not legitimately claim to be surprised, 
the prosecuting attorney, on retrial of the defendant, asked the court to call the witness 
as its own. The trial judge indicated that he did so, not because requested by the govern-
ment, but because the witness was an eyewitness whose testimony was needed. The case 
was noted in 18 TEX. L. R.Ev. 530 (1940).] See also United States v. Lutwak, (7th Cir. 
1952) 195 F. (2d) 748; Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Dist. Co., (5th Cir. 
1944) 143 F. (2d) 826. If the witness is called by the court, both parties are free to cross-
examine and to impeach. If the court thinks that the party wants the witness called solely 
for the purpose of impeachment, it will refuse. See Fong Lum Kwai v. United States, (9th 
Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 19, and Young v. United States, (5th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 490. 
It should be noted that many courts allow prior inconsistent statements to come before 
the jury on the grounds of refreshing recollection. Hurley v. State, 46 Ohio 320, 21 
N.E. 645 (1889); Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1893). This will be permissible, 
however, only if the witness confesses either a lack of knowledge or a failure of memory. 
Another group of cases indicates that, instead of permitting impeachment, a court may 
order all of the witness' testimony stricken from the record if the party who called the 
witness cannot elicit from him the information expected. Kuhn v. United States, (9th 
Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 910. See also Young v. United States, note 5 supra, and State v. 
Thome, 43 Wash. (2d) 47, 260 P. (2d) 331 (1953). 
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course) as substantive evidence.16 Essential to this reasoning is the belief 
that these prior statements are hearsay.17 Yet in this type of situation the 
declarant (witness) is in court and is subject to cross-examination, and 
there is little reason why this testimony should not be used as substantive 
evidence.18 Neither is there strong reason to maintain the ban against im-
peachment of one's own witness. So long as the courts continue to con-
sider the impeaching testimony objectionable as substantive evidence, how-
ever, the surprise and damage requirements provide desirable and workable 
rules of thumb for limiting the amount of this type of testimony which will 
go before a jury.19 
John A. Ziegler, Jr., S.Ed. 
Raymond Dittrich 
16 See State v. Nelson, note 13 supra; Young v. United States, note 5 supra. 
17 Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 P. 1099 (1922); Albert v. McKay &: Co., 174 Cal. 451, 
163 P. 666 (1917). 
18 For more extensive development of this argument, see: McCormick, "The Turn-
coat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence," 25 TEX. L. R.Ev. 573 (1947); 3 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1018 (1940); Morgan, "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
Hearsay Concept," 62 HARv. L. R.Ev. 177, 192 (1948). See also Rule 63 (1), UNIFORM RULES 
OF EVIDENCE. 
19 See McCormick's informal study of the question of whether a judge's instruction 
will be effective to prevent a jury from considering the impeaching testimony as sub-
stantive evidence. The judges he surveyed seemed to doubt if the jury understood or obeyed 
the instruction. McCormick, "The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive 
Evidence," 25 TEX. L. R.Ev. 573 (1947). 
